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Democratic traditions prescribe periodic elections to transfer political power within the 
modern nation-state. Political parties are quasi-public bodies which serve various critical 
functions to facilitate policy-making within multiparty constitutions. Myriad disputes 
potentially arise in the life of the party. Prior to 2008, two Kenyan statutory bodies, the 
Registrar of Societies (RS) and defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) regulated 
political party operations. This paper examines the judicial review of administrative decisions 
regarding leadership and nomination disputes in Kenyan political parties. To what extent can 
aggrieved officials, frustrated voters or unsuccessful aspirants challenge decisions by statutory 
bodies that wrongly recognize irregular party elections?  
Instrumental theory argues that administrative decisions should allocate procedural 
rights to citizens, voters or aggrieved aspirants if doing so increases the administrative 
efficiency to determine electoral outcomes. Public interest favours suppressing internal party 
wrangles. One variety, public choice theory, assumes that political markets are analogous to 
economic markets. If voters each choose their individual self-interest, then electoral outcomes 
reflect voter choices. Conversely, in non-instrumental theory, administrative decision-making 
prioritizes individual autonomy and self-determination. Expressive voting instead assumes 
that voters choose from behind a ‘veil of insignificance’. 
Assuming partial validity of both propositions, it follows that, in order for electoral outcomes 
to reflect voter choices, instrumental administrative decisions should be indirectly associated 
with non-instrumental voting behavior. Correspondingly, non-instrumental administrative 
decisions should vary inversely in relation to instrumental voting. A comparative study is 
made to test the validity of this hypothesis. Two recent decisions from the Kenyan high court 
are analyzed to determine the principles upon which judges review administrative decisions 
from public bodies regarding political parties. 
In Kenyatta’s Case where aggrieved party officials complained of being irregularly ousted 
from leadership positions, the court quashed the RS’s passive refusal to hear the dispute. Yet, 
arguably, the unstated rationale was that although party leadership is traditionally a private 
affair, in the Kenyan reality, eligible successors are anointed by elders along ascriptive lines. 
Thus party voting is merely expressive of ethnic demography, which generates macro-
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political disputes and is to this extent instrumental. However the RS’s and hence instrumental 
decision was reversed. 
In Aroko’s case the court was constrained by legislative ouster of jurisdiction, from 
interfering with the defunct ECK’s mandate to complete the nationwide general election 
timetable. Here the unstated rationale was arguably that at the nomination phase of elections, 
because ethnicity is relatively neutral, therefore self-interested or instrumental voting is 
predominant. The proportionality principle predicts that at party primaries, administrative 
decisions should be non-instrumental, and thus unsuccessful aspirants need not await the 
outcome of a general election to petition anomalies arising. Therefore, the judge called for 
legislation prescribing internalization of intra-party dispute resolution. The paper does not 
directly address inter-party election petition law.  
Section 2 outlines the historical and cultural context of socio-economic contradictions in 
Kenya which give rise to autocratic leadership and ethnic voting patterns. Section 3 contrasts 
instrumental and non-instrumental theories guiding administrators, politicians and voters. 
Sections 4 and 5 each present case studies. Section 6 shows that the proportionality principle 
informs protection of substantive political rights, while section 7 illustrates design of 
institutions for arbitration under the new Kenyan Constitution promulgated in 2010. 
2. CAUSES OF INTRA-PARTY DISPUTES IN KENYA 
2.1 Gerontocratic Leadership, Patriarchy and Ethnic Voting Patterns 
African customary law knew no elections.
1
 Leadership in most of Kenya’s forty-two tribes 
was acepholous, without any king. For example, Duncan Ndegwa explains how: 
The government and social organization of the Agikuyu recognized that shutting out 
change would lead to atrophy…The great Itwika, a once in a generation event, was an all 
inclusive constitutional review convention. It solemnized the handing and taking over of 
the responsibility of ruling the community, thus marking the devolvement of power by the 
older generation to the younger one after a period of about 30 to 40 year….The generation 
on the handing over power would do so at about the age of 55 years …A council of elders 
                                                            
1  Charles Khamala Without Kenyatta and Moi: Voting for a Change in James Shikwati (ed) Reclaiming 
Africa (Nairobi, Inter Region Economic Network, 2004) pp 287-328. 
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whose tenure of office changed during Itwika oversaw the day to day governance 
guardianship. 2 
This gerontocratic selection method was exploited by British “indirect rule” policy to exclude 
Africans from participation in the Legislative Council in the early 20th century.3 Instead 
customary norms applied to natives confined to reserves,4 without right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court. Contradictions between legal theory and practice created social tension. 
While the African nationalist struggle sought democracy, human rights, equality and social 
justice, the Mau Mau waged a guerrilla war in Central Kenya for land and freedom. Upon the 
colonial government outlawing and quelling the Mau Mau, leadership of the state was 
transferred to the ‘homeguards’ who defended the white settlers during the emergency.5 
Ethnic political parties
6
 were organized using similar ‘divide and rule’ strategies to exclude 
extremist revolutionaries in favour of foreign-educated, urbanized, ideological ‘counter-
revolutionaries’. Given Jomo Kenyatta’s pivotal international profile and symbolic role in the 
freedom movement, the Kenya African Union insisted upon his release from detention and 
installation as the country’s first president.7 At the 1961 pre-independence election, KAU’s 
successor, the Kenya National African Union’s (KANU) big tribes (Kikuyu and Luo), 
defeated the Kenya African Democratic Union’s (KADU) small tribes (Luhyia, Kalenjin and 
Mijikenda), 64% to 16%.8 KADU then abandoned its preference for a majimbo (federalist or 
devolved) governance model and was subsequently dissolved when its leaders joined KANU 
which changed the Westminster Constitution to suit its own unitary governance preference. 
Overcoming the triple enemies of illiteracy and poverty and disease, inspired Kenyatta’s 
independence pledge.9 However, he immediately abandoned African socialism.10 Instead, in 
continuation of capitalist exploitation, colonial racial discrimination was substituted by 
authoritarian ethnic patronage. Perpetuation of an irrational class structure by primitive 
                                                            
2  Duncan Ndegwa, Walking in Kenyatta’s Struggles: My Story (Nairobi, Kenya Leadership Institute, 
2006) 15-17. 
3  Yash Ghai and J. P. W. B.  McAuslan, Public Law and Law and Political Change in Kenya (Nairobi, 
Oxford, University Press, 1970). 
4  Native Land Ordinance 1930. 
5  Mahmoud Mamdani, Citizens and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(London, James Currey). 
6  Oanda Ongachi, Economic Reform  Economic Reform Political Liberalisation and Economic Ethnic 
Conflict in Kenya, Africa Development vol . XXIV, nos 1&2, 1999, pp 85-107 at  95. 
7  Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa: An Essay in Interpretation (Palgrave MacMillan, 1993). 
8  Bennnet and Rosberg, The Kenyatta Election (Oxford University Press, 1961), Nick Wanjohi Political 
Parties in Kenya: Formation, Policies and  Manifestoes (Nairobi, Views Media, 1997). 
9  Ibid. Kenyatta’s inaugural address. 
10  Sessional Paper no. 10 of 1965 African Socialism and its Application to Economic Planning. 
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accumulation resulted in protests against political elites, mainly Kikuyu, thus polarizing 
KANU. In a bid to sustain unity, Parliament passed a law requiring MP’s who defect from 
their party to seek re-election. In 1966, Luo leader Jaramogi Odinga nevertheless formed the 
Kenya Peoples Union. However, in 1969 it was banned. 
2.2 Development through Autocracy 
Michael O’Brien,11 recalls the ‘development first’ approach to building democracy. 
Initially, Martin Lispet12 explained the intellectual logic relating democracy and development. 
He opined that wealth accumulation generates a country’s capacity to sustain democracy. That 
where countries lack a minimum income level, political pluralism cannot take root. 
Development entails formation of a strong middle-class through accessible, widespread, 
popular education. Therefore he prescribed enhancing literacy rates so as to surpass the 
requisite income threshold. Subsequently, Samuel Huntington13 postulated that military 
reinforcement has a positive unifying influence. Further, that command fosters stability. 
Hence, single-party institutions are advantageous for developing countries. Together with 
Joan Nelson, his governance logic justified ‘an autocratic regime that suppresses political 
participation and promotes economic equality through land reform and other measures make 
possible…the subsequent expansion of political participation’.
14
 Thus Jomo Kenyatta’s de 
facto political monopoly systematically reduced political space through increased repression? 
including draconian detention, exile or assassination of political opponents. Simultaneously, 
KANU insiders received government support at general elections. For instance, upon 
nullification of Paul Ngei’s election15 in 1974, Parliament changed the constitution to extend 
the Presidential prerogative of mercy to include election offences. Ngei was pardoned and 
won the ensuing by-election. 
2.3 KANU’s Monopoly 
                                                            
11  Mitchell O’Brien, The Nexus Among Parliaments, Poverty Reduction and Conflict Prevention in 
Mitchell O’Brien, Rich Stapenhurst and Niall Johnston (eds), Parliaments as Peace Builders in Conflict-Affected 
Countries (Washington, The World Bank, 2008) 11-26. 
12  Seymour Martin Lispet, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy (Mar., 1959) The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, 69-105. 
13  Samuel P. Huntington, The Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1968). 
14  Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing 
Countries (Harvard University Press, 1976). 
15  Raphael Samson Kithika Mbondo v Luka David Galgalo and Paul Joseph Ngei Election Amendment 
no. 14 of 1975 (Ngei’s Case). See Winnie Mitullah, Exercise of Executive Powers in Kenya: The Case of 
Prerogative of Mercy in Morris Odhiambo, Osogo Ambani and Winnie V. Mitullah (eds) Informing a 
Constitutional Moment: Essays on Constitution Reform in Kenya (Nairobi, Claripress, 2005) 1-15 at 11.  
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After Kenyatta’s death in 1978, the ‘development first’ policy was inherited by Daniel 
Arap Moi through the Nyayo (footsteps, symbolizing continuity) philosophy.16 However, 
ethnic polarity was reversed with small tribes at the authoritarian centre and large ones at the 
marginal periphery. In June 1982 the Constitution was amended proclaiming KANU the sole 
political party.17 Increasing centralization, repression and exclusion precipitated a coup-
attempt spearheaded by some junior Air Force officers. The key perpetrators were arrested, 
tried and executed for treason.18 De jure one-partyism relied upon four strategies to restrict 
political competition. First, denial of any platform from which to speak without offending 
sedition laws. Entry barriers thus prevented outsiders from offering alternative policies to the 
electorate. One ironic victim of targeted, political exclusion was the country’s second most 
powerful individual, Charles Njonjo, Kenya’s first and longstanding Attorney General and 
later Moi’s Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs. In 1983 a Presidential Commission 
of Inquiry found him ‘guilty’ of smuggling in arms from South Africa with intent to take over 
the country illegally and branded him a ‘traitor,’ thereby destroying his reputation, ending his 
political career.19 Second, the 1987 general elections were conducted through a mlolongo 
(queue-voting) system with dual disadvantages for voters and candidates. Few voters were 
willing to be seen queuing behind candidates perceived as government critics. Worse still, 
unsuccessful candidates, despite blatant rigging, were denied capacity to petition electoral 
outcomes since queuing was legally presumed to deliver transparent results.20 This procedure 
was designed to weed-out the few remaining popular critics from within Parliament. Third, 
political information was controlled through the sole broadcasting station, Voice of Kenya. 
Fourth, from the mid-80’s government intelligence and police actively coerced dissenters by 
cracking down on various unlawful organizations, principally Mwakenya. Under 
constitutional changes denying bail to persons accused of capital offences, suspected 
dissidents were arrested on ‘trumped-up’ charges and confined in custody. In 1986 security of 
                                                            
16  Supra note 1 at 306-7. 
17  Babafemi A. Bajdejo, Raila Odinga: An Enigma in Kenya Politics (Lagos and Nairobi, Yintab Press, 
2006); see also Ibid. at 307-9. 
18  Hezekiah Rabala Ochuka and Pancras Oteyo Okumu were executed on May 17, 1987 along with seven 
other members, mainly Luos, of the “Peoples Redemption Council.” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamiti_Maximum_Security_Prison (accessed on 8 August 2011). 
http://westfm.co.ke/mobile/index.php?page=news&id=2907 (accessed on 8 August 2011). 
19  Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Allegations Involving Charles Mungane 
Njonjo” (Republic of Kenya, 1984). 
20  Kibe Mungai, The Law and Leadership: The Post-Colonial Experience in Kenya in Kimani Njogu (ed) 
Governance and Development: Towards Quality Leadership in Kenya (Nairobi, Twaweza Communications, 
2007) 50-103 at 75-77. 
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tenure for constitutional officers, including the Auditor General and Attorney General, then in 
1988, High Court judges, were repealed. Lawyers were detained alongside political activists 
they were representing. Kenya became a highly unequal, intense, police state.
21
 
However upon the fall of Eastern socialism, the Bretton Woods Institutions–which had 
supported Western-aligned dictatorships during the Cold War–dramatically changed their aid 
policies so as to recognize good governance and anti-corruption as preconditions to economic 
development.22 Recently, Prezworkski23 refutes ‘development first’ heresy by explaining that 
investors seeking safe havens in autocracies, tend to flee upon a whiff of instability. 
Conversely, he shows that although democracies show short-term instability, through protests, 
strikes and riots–changes in government are nevertheless–economically inconsequential. 
Hence Kenyan activism combined with international pressure to force the restoration of 
secure tenure of constitutional officers in 1990 and repeal of section 2A of the Constitution in 
December 1991, ushering in formal return to multiparty democracy.24  
2.4 Multipartism: Electoral Violence, Voter Bribery, Party Fragmentation and 
Frustrated Petitions 
Notwithstanding the requirement under section 1A proclaiming that ‘The Republic of 
Kenya shall be a multiparty democratic state,’ political party delinquencies persisted. Being 
from a ‘small tribe’, Moi strategically inter alia, changed the Constitution to require 
Presidential candidates to win–not only an overall majority–but also at least 25% of votes in 5 
out of the 8 provinces.
25
 No guarantee was given to the Condorcet winner.
26
 Neither was 
public space immediately created to facilitate participatory, free and fair elections. Nor was 
the ECK sufficiently empowered to provide neutral management of the electoral system. 
Instead throughout the 1990’s the provincial administration and the police allegedly 
acquiesced in ethnic conflicts instigated by KANU politicians.27 The country’s worst 
                                                            
21  David William Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, The Risks of Knowledge: Investigations into the 
death of the Late Hon Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya 1990 (Ohio University Press and East African 
Educational Publishers Ltd, 2004). 
22  Report on Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Washington D C, The World Bank, 
1989). 
23
  Adam Prezworkski, Democracy and Economic Development in Edward D. Mansfield and Richard 
Sisson (eds.), The Evolution of Political Knowledge (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 2004). 
24  The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act no. 12 of 1991. 
25  The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act no. 6 of 1992. 
26   Supra note 11, the candidate who would win a head-to-head contest against each and every other., 
27  The Akiwumi Report, The Report of the Judicial Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya between 1991-
1998 (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1998); Amos Wako, The Attorney General, The Government’s Reply, 
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economic crisis was precipitated by theft of kshs 13.8 billion (US$ dollars 200,000 million) 
from the Central Bank on the pretext of compensating a local Asian company, Goldenberg 
International Ltd., for fictitious mineral exports, but in reality to finance KANU’s electoral 
campaigns.28 Hence at both the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections, Moi astutely survived 
by garnering minority votes of 36% and 40%, respectively. Opposition parties were 
destabilized by use of several strategies including legal manipulation and subtle 
gerrymandering, historical ‘cult personality’ of leaders created and sustained through ethnic 
polarization and vote-buying, exacerbated by land clashes, amid poverty. The fragmentation 
of the original 1992 Forum for the Restoration of Democracy into FORD-Kenya, FORD-Asili 
and later FORD-People characterized ethnicization of immature political parties. 
In 2002, Kenyatta’s son Uhuru was anointed Moi’s preferred successor of KANU.
29
 By 
neutralizing the Kikuyu numerical superiority, thus undermining Mwai Kibaki’s advantage, 
while simultaneously alienating KANU’s Luo and Kamba leaders–whom Moi predicted 
would defect and form nascent ethnic parties. This tactic sought to split the opposition for a 
third time. However, upon KANU’s nomination of Uhuru by ‘acclamation’, disappointed 
potential aspirants, Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka, called Moi’s bluff. They instead 
chose to close ranks by supporting Kibaki under the National Rainbow Coalition, a holding 
party. Historically, NARCs 62%: 30% victory amounts to a reversal of KANU’s margin over 
KADU at the pre-independence election. KANU’s defeat is attributable to the Luos’ 
defection, combined with traditionally neutral Kamba support, for NARC together with its 
absorption of a significant proportion of KADU’s small tribes. Conversely, Uhuru’s defeated 
KANU remained mainly Kalenjin, shored up by only 30% of the Kikuyu (Kiambu) vote. Yet 
despite Kibaki’s substantial goodwill to change the autocratic, exclusionist, inequitable 
constitution, he reneged on his pledge to democratize the country by inter alia sharing power. 
Instead the government’s command-driven, proposed new constitutional model was 
resoundingly rejected (57:43) at the 2005 referendum. NARC disintegrated into its LDP (Luo 
and Kamba) and NAK (Kikuyu and Luhyia) ethnic factions.30 Prior to the 2007 general 
elections, the “orange” symbol–representing rejection of authoritarianism–was mischievously 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Nairobi (The Government Printer, 1998); Wachira Maina and George Kegoro, Impunity: The Law Society of 
Kenya Report on the Judicial Inquiry  into Tribal Clashes (Nairobi, 1998); supra note 1. 
28  The Bosire Report, The Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair 
(Nairobi, Government Printer, 2005);See also ante note. 
29  Supra note 1 at 317-320. 




accorded dual registration under Orange Democratic Movement-Party and Orange 
Democratic Movement-Kenya. This was yet another government attempt to “divide and rule” 
opposition ethnic blocs and retain centralized power. 
3. THE VOTER’S INTEREST: BETWEEN PROCESS RIGHTS AND 
PUBLIC GOODS 
3.1 Instrumentalism 
3.1.1 Voter’s Self Interest 
Public choice theory assumes that voters are deciders in political markets, like 
consumers in economic markets.31 Hence voters instrumentally choose public policies which 
satisfy their individual needs or desires. If voters’ choices are free and fair, then electoral 
outcomes correspond to voter preferences.
32
 Electoral theory assumes that democratic systems 
are tailored–depending on demographic distribution–to facilitate voter choice in relation to 
parliamentary seats, whether by majority, unanimous, candidate ranking or proportional 
representation.
33
 The one-man-one-vote principle is paramount.
34
 In sum, if MPs fail to 
deliver public goods which satisfy voter preferences, then the voters’ remedy is to make an 
alternative choice at future elections. Analogous to perfect economic markets,35 perfect 
electoral markets require: First, no barriers to registration or cessation of political parties, or 
impediment on equal membership rights. Second, large numbers of registered voters and 
nominated candidates at party primaries. Third, wide publication and circulation of party 
manifestoes through civic and voter education. Fourth, assuming that self-interested voters 
choose their genuinely held preferences, if each ballot carries equal weight, then voter choices 
are decisive of electoral outcomes. In a presidential system, the candidate with most votes–or 
in a parliamentary democracy the party with most MPs–forms government and determines 
                                                            
31  Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration (Jun., 
1973) 2 J. Legal Studies 399, Vol. 2, No. 2 pp. 399-458. “By public choice theory we mean the application of 
techniques and methods of mainstream economics to the study of political processes. It is faithful to the 
individualist method.” quoted in Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomansky post note 39 at 2. 
32  Brennan and Lomansky post note 39 at 17 & 21. 
33  Supra note 11. 
34  John Mickuki v Attorney General HC Misc App 975 of 2001 Judgment 12 Mar 2002, J V O Juma and 
Mbogholi Msaga JJ held section 5 of the Districts and Provinces Act void and unconstitutional to the extent it 
amended the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act (1968) and purported to empower the President with 
authority to create new districts administratively. 
35  Roger D. Blair and David L. Kaserman, Antitrust Economics, (Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 
1985)  3-4. 
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collective policies. Mitchell O’Brien36 accuses western countries with only two strong parties 
of reducing political competition. Similarly, forming coalitions prior to polls should be 
discouraged since party leaders effectively collude to impose a single candidate, and their 
selfish political interests, on voters. This principle is problematic within African communities. 
Furthermore, at national level, it is submitted, power-sharing between ethnic groups of 
different sizes seems to require proportional representation to expression of cultural diversity. 
Toleration of ineffective economic leadership may be seen as a as a lesser evil compared to 
‘zero sum’ political competition which tends to precipitate violent conflicts. 
3.1.2 Administrative Decisions 
Jeremy Bentham’s37 utilitarianism holds that efficient laws and morals should 
effectively satisfy the greatest happiness of the greatest number. P. P. Craig explains that in 
administrative law, substantive rules have 3 objectives, depending on whether their purpose is 
to grant welfare benefits, licensing or planning permission. This paper focuses on how 
licensing rules may ‘secure that only those with certain qualities are given certain types of 
licences’.38 For example, where returning officers issue certificates to recognize successful 
candidates, they ensure that only those with certain policies are certified as eligible to hold 
elective positions. Of relevance here, are situations where only those with popular majority 
votes are recognized as party leaders or duly nominated candidates to contest general 
elections. The Kenyan cases to be analyzed, consider an administrator–whether the Registrar 
of Societies, of Political Parties or Electoral Commission–who decides that an aspirant does 
not come within the prescribed statutory formula and the administrator wishes to reject the 
claim without hearing the complaint raised by such aspirant. Yet the aspirant feels aggrieved 
by the administrator’s misinterpretation of facts, law or procedure. A judge may apply a non- 
instrumental rationale to review the administrative decision and instead decide that the law 
provides for hearing rights. By assuming that statutory formulas correspond to substantive 
outcomes, grounds supporting such judicial review are sustainable. Conversely, Craig’s 
instrumental test is that if the administrative cost entailed by granting procedural rights to 
                                                            
36  Supra note 11. 
37  Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation discussed in P.P. Craig, Public Law and 
Democracy (1989) PL 407. 
38  P. P. Craig, Procedures and Administrative Decision-making: A Common Law Perspective (1993) 
European Review of Pubic Law, (London, Esperia Publications Ltd, 1993) 55-69 at 63. Also generally P. P. 
Craig, Administrative Law (2nd ed, Oxford, 1989) ch 7. 
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aspirants, exceeds the likely benefits accruing from the substantive outcome, then no hearing 
rights should be given.39 
3.2 Non Instrumentality 
3.2.1 Voter’s Expressive Interest 
Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomansky40 refute public choice theory’s assumption that voters 
in large-scale democracies are self-interested maximizers. They agree that in economic 
markets, private consumer demands are decisive of commodity supplies, reflected in the just 
price. However, in large elections–save in rare cases where there is a tie–an individual voter’s 
choice is not decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Neither the voter’s cost of 
attending at the polling booth, nor marking the ballot paper, entail that likely satisfaction of 
voter preferences shall accrue.
41
 Instead, electoral outcomes depend upon how others vote, 
rendering individual choice superfluous. Just as cheering for one’s preferred football team is 
not decisive of the score, so also purely expressive voter choices for a preferred candidate are 
detached from electoral outcomes. Recent evidence
42
 from Kenya supports expressive voter 
theory. In 2007, pre-electoral presidential opinion polls predicted 43% each–for incumbent 
president Kibaki (PNU) as well as his main rival Raila (ODM-K). The race was too close to 
call. Despite peripheral candidate Musyoka’s (ODM) nil prospects of victory, he nevertheless 
polled 9%. Hence Musyoka’s block was systemically decisive in swinging the outcome. 
Public choice theory predicts that rational, self-interested voters would, rather than ‘waste’ 
their vote, instrumentally choose strategically from either of the leading contenders, the 
candidate considered most likely to secure their ‘second best’ preferences. Clearly, public 
choice rationale underestimates the Kenyan voter’s purely expressive interest in choosing 
group or ethnic interest. Rather, according to official results, Musyoka retained approximately 
                                                            
39  Ibid., 57. 
40  Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomansky, Democracy and Decision: Pure theory of Electoral Preference 
(Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp 20-21 ‘Should homo economics be imported into electoral politics? 
Consumer choice and voter choice are fundamentally different decision-theoretic terms. Hence market behavior 
and political behavior are likely to be distinctively different. While interests may predominate in market 
behavior, they are strongly muted in the ballot box. Conversely ethical considerations which are muted in the 
market-place are likely to play an increased role in democratic elections.’ 
41  Ibid., 35. 
42  Makau Mutua supra note 30. 
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879,903–mainly Ukambami voters–compared to Kibaki’s 4,584,721 and Raila’s 4,352,721, 
largely from their own respective mutually exclusive, ethnic voting blocs.43 
3.2.2 Administrative Decisions 
Aristotle argued that man is by nature, a political animal.44 In relation to others, 
individuals occupy social positions and play certain roles, thus generating role-expectations 
and obligations. Criticizing pure reason, it was Immanuel Kant45 who first distinguished 
utilitarian hedonistic need for physical goods from the moral human sentiment to appreciate 
abstract rights. He thus rejected the utilitarian prescription of using individuals as means for 
attaining social goals. Rather, each person should be treated as an end. Each individual should 
maximize their potential to be the best they can be. Hence universal rules should protect 
actions which can be performed by everyone.
46
 Thus Craig alternatively justifies the law of 
giving process rights to guide administrative decisions by the non-instrumental or dignitarian 
rationale.47 
Kantian logic gives rise to three varieties of social contract theory.
48
 First, because rational 
people feel indignation at having their plans arbitrarily interfered with–whether by private 
persons or public authorities–therefore constraint of power wielders–politicians and 
bureaucrats–is justified. To facilitate free choice, people require a safe environment. Thus 
public administration should be predictable. Natural justice process rights guide adjudication 
by hearing both sides (audi alteram partem), not being biased and providing reasons for 
decisions. This adjudicative approach protects personhood, autonomy and dignity. Second, 
social contract may be implied, constructive or inferred from conduct. Irrespective of whether 
such commitments reflect contractors’ actual preferences, freely chosen contractual terms 
create binding agreements. If promises were broken, then the institution of promising would 
be abandoned, making social interactions more uncertain.49 
                                                            
43  Johann Kriegler, Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in 
Kenya on 27 December 2007. 
44  Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by W. D. Ross (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1908). 
45  Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
46  Barbara Hudson, Justice in the Risk Society: Challenging and Re-Affirming Justice in Late Modernity 
(London: Sage Publications, 2003). 
47  Supra note 38 at 38 ‘process rights are required as part of what it means to be a person. Life 
necessitates interaction with, and reliance on others…’. 
48  Supra note 39 at 57-58. 
49  Ibid., 58. 
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Third, John Rawls50 assumes, in heterogeneous societies, that voters have different 
preferences. If voters are oblivious to their actual positions in present and future society, and 
if they choose constitutional public goods, then electoral outcomes between competing ideas 
of public good is impartial.  Rational choice is guaranteed by a hypothetical ‘veil of 
ignorance’. Hence voters are motivated to choose constitutional and institutional rules that 
satisfy preferences of vulnerable groups. It is reasonable for one to insure against being 
victimized by repressive rules. Certain ‘merit’ goods such as cultural heritage are 
underproduced and underconsumed in ideal markets, though intrinsically valuable. 
Conversely, harmful ‘demerit’ goods, e.g. heroin or gambling are overproduced and 
overconsumed.  Hence for Brennan and Lomansky51 administrators would be justified in 
giving procedural rights to aspirants who represent special interests. The pervious Kenyan 
Constitution52 for example, provides for nomination of twelve unelected individuals as MP’s 
in proportion to the Parliamentary strength of political parties, ‘taking into account the 
principle of gender equality’.
53
 The current Constitution requires that not more than two thirds 
of either gender should be appointed or elected as officials to leadership positions in any 
public body. Yet in practice, political parties do not choose minorities to faithfully balance 
ideological debate. Under the current Constitution, the Judicial Service Commission 
nominated only two women to fill the seven the Supreme Court vacancies. Similarly, it does 
not follow that Rawls’s principles of justice, would be chosen, even assuming voters would 
prefer his two principles under extreme uncertainty of the ‘original position.’ Moreso in the 
African context where voters are acutely aware of their ethnic identify and choose kin 
affiliation even though they may prefer ‘rational’ development. Although goods are not 
valued uniformly by different people or over time, Ronald Dworkin
54
 thus insists that 
substantive rights are trumps over process rights, since equality is the sovereign virtue.55 
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4. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NON INSTRUMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECISIONS AFFECTING POLITICAL PARTIES 
4.1 Anatomy of a Party Coup 
The Kenyan case of Republic v Registrar of Societies and 5 Others exparte Kenyatta 
and 6 Others
56 involved a dispute between two rival factions over KANU leadership. On 31 
January-1 February 2006, KANU’s National Delegate’s Conference (NDC) elected Uhuru 
Kenyatta’s faction (Uhuru) as party office bearers. However, the Nicholas Biwott faction57 
(Biwott) was dissatisfied with the electoral outcome. Later, Biwott accused Uhuru of 
abandoning KANU and joining ODM-K. On 24 November 2006, at Mombasa, Biwott 
allegedly held a Special NDC at which fresh elections were held and Biwott was purportedly 
voted KANU chairman. On 26 November at Nairobi, Uhuru convened an NDC which 
endorsed KANU’s co-operation, but not merger, with ODM-K. Simultaneously, on 27 
November both factions wrote letters to the Registrar of Societies (RS) claiming KANU 
leadership. Additionally, Biwott submitted a notification of change of officials, in form ‘H’, to 
which, Uhuru’s advocates objected, by a counter-letter. Ignoring Uhuru’s objection, however, 
on 28 November, the RS proceeded to register Biwott’s faction as the new officials and wrote 
to Uhuru communicating the register’s new status. Further, on 1 December, the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK) upon receiving a letter from Biwott asserting that his faction 
were the new registered officials, wrote a letter informing Uhuru that ECK ‘would from now 
treat the named persons (Biwott faction) as the official leaders of KANU in the offices listed 
against their names’ (brackets mine). Curiously, on 2 December, the RS wrote to Uhuru’s 
faction recognizing that a dispute between the rival factions had arisen, thus summoning him 
to attend before her on the morning of 5 December to resolve the dispute. However, on 4 
December the RS re-wrote to Uhuru’s faction cancelling the scheduled meeting, asserting that 
she had already acted on the matter and was functus officio. 
Uhuru’s faction, were aggrieved by various decisions of the RS and ECK, and moved to the 
High Court by way of judicial review seeking to quash these administrative decisions and 
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prohibit Biwott’s faction from assuming control of KANU affairs and to compel both the RS 
and ECK to reinstate the public records to the state in which they were prior to the illegal 
changes complained of. Uhuru argued that, first, KANU’s Constitution permits co-operation 
and mergers with other parties. Indeed, being Kenya’s oldest political party it had a history of 
such co-operation since 1964 when it merged with KADU, which was subsequently 
dissolved.58 Similarly, in 2000 it co-operated with the National Development Party with 
which it eventually merged and NDP too was dissolved. Therefore, co-operation with ODM-
K did not mean that Uhuru’s faction had abandoned KANU and joined ODM-K. Second, 
political parties are neither defined in the Societies Act nor the National Assembly and 
Presidential Elections Act (NAPEA), but in the Constitution itself. Further the Constitution 
provides that ‘Kenya shall be a multi-party democratic state’.
59
 Therefore, any purported 
administrative decisions to accept Biwott’s alleged notification of change of officials should 
have had regard not simply to the legislation but also the constitutional role played by 
political parties. Key constitutional functions by political parties include nominating 
candidates to vie for general elections, parliamentary political parties not only nominate MP’s 
to parliament but also the members of the East African Legislative Assembly. Opposition 
parties may also permit appointment of their MP’s to government.
60
 Third, that the 
administrative decisions to register and recognize Biwott’s faction contravened KANU’s 
Constitution in various respects: Only the National Executive Committee or Party Chairman 
can summon a Special NDC–not the National Governing Council.
61
 Hence Biwott’s purported 
Special NDC was ultra vires KANU’s Constitution. Fourth, no proper notices were given to 
the two thousand KANU branch delegates to attend Biwott’s purported Special NDC and the 
people who attended and voted were not bona fide delegates.
62
 Fifth, Biwott’s notification of 
change of officials in form ‘H’ purported to create a new post of Deputy National Chairman 
allegedly won by Katana Ngala.63 Yet no change was effected to KANU’s constitution 
establishing such post. Moreover, upon losing the January election Biwott publicly announced 
formation of New KANU. ‘He (Mr. Biwott asked the Kalenjin community to unite, saying it 
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61  Ibid., 534-6. 
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was the only way they could be assured of success in their political strategy’. 64 Hence Uhuru 
submitted that the administrative decisions by the public bodies to register Biwott’s faction 
were unprocedural, biased, illegal null and void, unreasonable and illegal and should be 
quashed.65 
4.2 Passive Bureaucracy 
The Respondents defended the RS’s decision on several grounds. First, the Attorney 
General argued that the Societies Act neither requires an administrative decision to be made 
by the RS upon receipt of a notification of change of party leadership nor did the RS make 
any decision. Rather, the registration process involving receipt of form ‘H’ and issuance of an 
official receipt upon payment for services rendered was merely a passive updating of records. 
Uhuru had no legitimate expectation from the RS since his ouster was purely an internal party 
affair.66 Hence, second, the law imposed no legal duty upon the RS to consider objections 
raised by Uhuru’s faction.67 Third, letters written by the RS to Biwott’s faction did not 
constitute an administrative decision but were merely a courteous reply to a request for 
information regarding the state of the public register, which information was available to 
anyone upon perusal of the public records.68 Fourth, Biwott asserted that Uhuru’s faction – 
having abandoned KANU and joined ODM-K – lacked locus standi (capacity to sue)
69
 and, 
fifth, were therefore in contempt of court.70 Moreover, sixth KANU’s constitution does not 
approve of collaboration or cooperation with other parties unless in its own interests. Hence 
Uhuru’s fugitive faction was disentitled from receiving notices from Biwott’s lot convening 
of the Special NDC.71 Seventh, KANU’s Constitution does not require its chairman to be the 
leader of opposition, as the two offices have no nexus.72 Eighth, Biwott agreed that political 
parties are societies sui generis which have a special position within the Kenyan constitution. 
Sections 34(d) and 123 ‘preserve the integrity and supremacy of party members and the party 
constitution, to preserve substantive rights to freedom of association and from discrimination. 
Yet notwithstanding voluntary association, (Biwott) insisted that political parties remain 
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private clubs’.73 Not only was KANU not a party to the court proceedings but also the court 
could not substitute its own discretion for the RS’s administrative decision.74 Lastly, the ECK 
denied making a decision and claimed to be entitled to rely on the RS’s records as conclusive 
evidence of party leadership.75 
4.3 Public Law Remedies and the Right to be Heard 
High Court judges Al Nashir Visram (as he then was), Roselyn Wendoh and Anyara 
Emuhule JJ adjudged the disputed party leadership as follows: First, Uhuru’s faction, being 
the immediate former KANU officials, was aggrieved by the change effected to the register. 
They therefore had proper legal standing before the court and, second, were not in contempt.76 
Third, co-operation between party officials, party leaders and members – with other parties 
regarding shared ideals, visions or objectives – does not constitute merger or abandonment of 
a political party. Such cessation of party membership or resignation must be effected 
officially or formally, not constructively.77 Fourth, their Lordships rejected suggestions of non 
availability of public law remedies. Because the Societies Act requires form ‘H’ to be 
submitted within fourteen days of a party resolution purporting to effect any leadership 
change and to be signed by 3 party officials, therefore the RS’s duty extended beyond 
receiving and filing away notification of change. Specifically, the RS had a duty to inquire 
into whether Biwott’s Special NDC was properly convened with proper quorum, and voting 
proceeded according to the KANU Constitution. Moreover, the fact that Biwott’s form ‘H’ 
contained the extraneous position of Deputy National Chairman without KANU’s 
Constitution having been properly amended indicated that the notification was illegal.78 The 
AG’s contention that the RS’s function is ‘passive’ imposing no ‘positive duty’79 was rejected 
as ‘simplistic and pedantic’, Since it was the RS’s duty to prosecute officials for failure to file 
form ‘H’, This implies conducting investigations. Fifth, the RS erred by failing to accord the 
Uhuru faction two hearings. Initially, upon receiving an objection prior to changing the 
register. Again, before confirming her administrative decision to register Biwott’s faction. 
‘The whole exercise appeared to have been choreographed and became a charade tainted with 
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both procedural impropriety, unfairness, breach of the rules of natural justice, bias and 
outright illegality on the part of the Registrar of Societies’.80 Worse still while cancelling the 
hearing  scheduled for 5 December by writing to Uhuru, the RS admitted being functus officio 
(having discharged a duty) claiming: ‘this letter confirms to you, that vide a letter of 28th 
November 2006, a new set of officials were registered. Therefore, this office is unable to 
register and or confirm a second set of officials’.81 Sixth, ECK’s suggestion that its letter 
conveying recognition of the register is superfluous since it had no administrative decision to 
take was dismissed as a ‘Mickey Mouse’ argument.82 On the contrary, both are public bodies 
but ECK being a constitutional creature is supreme over and should supervise the RS. It 
amounted to abdication of mandate for the ECK Chairman to on one hand, rely on Biwott’s 
letter as a basis upon which to treat his faction as the new KANU officials without even 
verifying the position from the RS, to determine for himself the veracity of its contents, while  
on the other hand, ‘by purporting to convey a decision of the Commission, and later 
purporting to rescind the same on oath, on the ground that the same was not made in 
accordance with the Commission’s procedures, the Commission has failed itself and acted 
illegally’.83 Concluding that ‘a party is key to democratic governance’, 84 the Court quashed 
both the RS and ECK administrative decisions and ordered that the register should reflect its 
state prior to notification of change.85 
4.4 Call for a Political Parties Act 
Kenyatta’s Case departed from the High Court decision in Ngare & Others v Registrar of 
Cooperative Societies
86 which held ‘as regards the elected officials the order of certiorari 
cannot apply against them as they hold their present office by virtue of the decision of the 
Registrar’. It further rejected Dr Anangwe’s Case
87
 which held that political parties are not 
amenable to judicial review. In this respect Kenyatta rejected the American case of Obrien v 
Brown
88 where courts have been reluctant to deal with intra party disputes. Instead Kenyatta 
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invoked Lord Denning’s English decision in Regina v Greater London Council exparte 
Blackburn that: 
…there is high constitutional principle, if there is good ground for supposing that a 
government department or public official is transgressing or about to transgress the law in 
a way which hinders citizens, then any one of those offended or injured can draw attention 
of the courts of law and seek to have the law enforced and the courts in their discretion 
can grant whatever remedy is appropriate.89 
Conversely, in 1996’s when a leadership dispute arose between KijanaWamalwa and Raila 
Odinga over control of FORD-K, the courts ordered a re-election. Raila instead dynamically 
defected accompanied by his ethnic voting bloc–to NDP and successfully defended his 
Lang’ata seat–at the ensuing by-election. Instead, the Kenyatta court’s recent expansion of 
judicial review of administrative decisions regarding intra-party disputes relied on Republic v 
AG and the Registrar of Societies
90 where Nyamu and Ibrahim JJ concluded ‘that the law of 
Judicial Review had not yet reached the furthest or the last frontier and that courts must 
endeavour to expand the grounds of intervention depending on the circumstances before 
them’. Recognizing the need for innovative law to reflect and regulate emerging Kenyan 
realpolitck Kenyatta’s case called for radical reform:  
There is an urgent need to delink the formation and registration of political parties from 
the claws of the Societies Act, and by providing legislation, the creation, administration 
and management of political parties as separate legal entities, with capacities to sue and be 
sued in their corporate names, and to provide also for their legal cessation of life as such 
legal entities.91  
Kenyatta asserts that administrative decisions regarding disputed party leadership should be 
non-instrumentally made as the role of public bodies is not merely to ‘rubber stamp’ letters–
which may be forgeries–received from factions contesting leadership. Yet, given that Uhuru 
was initially anointed as retiring President Moi’s preferred successor in 2002, and nominated 
by delegates by acclamation, therefore the Jan-Feb 2006 NDC choice to elect Uhuru’s faction 
does not reflect–applying Brenann and Lomansky’s non-instrumental theory–the voter’s self-
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interest, but rather, their expressive interest. By reinstating Uhuru’s faction to the register, the 
court’s judgment effectively endorses the importance of Kenyan voter’s expressive interest in 
anointing party leaders. 
5. JUDICIAL CONSTRAINT AGAINST INTERFERENCE WITH 
INSTRUMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AFFECTING PARTY 
PRIMARIES 
5.1 Strategic Positioning by Unsuccessful Aspirants 
On 16 November 2007 Aroko and his colleague (the aspirants) vied for nomination to 
contest the 2007 general election for Kasipul Kabondo constituency on an ODM ticket. They 
were unsuccessful. On 21 November in Aroko & Another v Kwach and 5 Others92 they sued 
the party Returning Officer (RO), its National Election Board, the successful candidate and 
ECK alleging that various irregularities marred the party primaries. They sought a temporary 
injunction restraining the ECK from recognizing ODM’s nominee-elect due on 23 November 
and demanded a repeat of the party nomination process in respect of their constituency. 
However, the ECK objected to the court’s jurisdiction over the dispute. First, because general 
elections are regulated by the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act (NAEPA) 
and rules thereunder which prescribe election courts as the only forum to determine any 
election disputes. Such courts are created by special gazette notices after publication of 
general election results. Second, the avenue for invoking the election court’s jurisdiction is by 
election petition, not by ordinary plaint reserved for civil disputes. However, the aspirants 
replied that the electoral law and procedures are intended to regulate national ‘elections’ 
which are separate and distinct from party ‘nominations’. Hence they insisted that election 
courts have no business organizing and supervising party nominations. High Court Judge 
Michael Khamoni’s ruling on this preliminary point of law was delivered on 23 November, 
when party nomination lists were due to ECK, 27 December having been declared the general 
election date. 
5.2 Conflicting Judgments Regarding Court Jurisdiction 
The court was required to weigh conflicting court of appeal decisions regarding 
whether or not the ordinary high court, not being an election court, can resolve disputed party 
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primaries. On one hand, in Richard Chirchir & Another v Henry Cheboiwo & Another93 
Gachuhi, Kwach and Cockar JJA on 24 December 1992 restrained a returning officer from 
publishing purported nomination results in the Kenya gazette in relation to a general election 
scheduled for 29 December 1992.Whether or how that court order was enforced is unclear. 
On the other hand, earlier that year, the Court of Appeal including Kwach and Cockar JJA in 
Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume
94
 held that ‘where there is a clear procedure for 
the redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, 
that procedure should be strictly followed’. Moreover, in Wanyoike v The Electoral 
Commission and Another (no. 2)
95 with facts similar to Aroko, the court of appeal followed 
Karume. In Wanyoike, on 15 August 1995 some disgruntled FORD-Asili members sued their 
party officials upon which the Nakuru Chief Magistrate’s Court restrained the ECK from 
recognizing Wanyoike’s nomination as FORD-A’s candidate to contest the Kipiripiri 
constituency Parliamentary election. Later that day, Wanyoike obtained a stay of execution 
order from the Nyeri high court against the subordinate court’s injunction. However, upon 
arrival at the returning officer’s office the 1:00 p.m. deadline for submission of nomination 
papers had elapsed. Wanyoike therefore returned to the high court seeking to restrain the 
ECK’s refusal to receive his nomination papers and recognize his candidacy. The high court 
declined. Unfortunately, because Wanyoike had no arguable appeal and because he had an 
alternative remedy by way of election petition, therefore, the court of appeal refused to stay 
the High Court’s refusal. ‘The fact that election petitions take long to determine cannot be 
legal justification for not following clear provisions contained in (NAPEA)’ (brackets 
mine).96 Fatefully, Ford-A fielded no candidate courtesy of intra-party wrangling. Khamoni J 
cautioned that ‘courts should not be willing to be used to stifle democracy.’
97
 
5.3 The Rule in Ngei’s Case: Costs and Benefits 
Wanyoike’s case asserted full support in authority both local and foreign of the rule in 
Ngei’s case.
98 The incident occurred during the national or parliamentary election 
nominations, under the de facto one-party state. Ngei and his supporters physically impeded 
Mbondo from presenting his nomination papers. Mbondo waited until after the results of the 
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general elections were published before petitioning the election court which nullified Ngei’s 
election upon finding him guilty of an election offence. Adopting the rule in Ngei’s case, 
Judge Khamoni held that s 42 A (b) and (c) of the Constitution ‘confer ECK responsibility for 
directing and supervising Presidential, National Assembly and local government, elections; 
promoting free and fair elections’.99 Yet the judge was ‘not aware whether the Electoral 
Commission has the power to determine disputes arising from party nominations between 
competing candidates or between a candidate and his party officials in a manner a court would 
do when there is no agreement’.100 Instead s 44 of the Constitution as read with s 2 of the 
NAPEA confer limited ‘jurisdiction’ upon an ‘election court’ merely ‘to hear and determine 
any question…whether (a) person has been validly elected as a member of the National 
Assembly’;
101
 The judge held that an Election Court only exercises that jurisdiction after an 
election has taken place and that a person against whom the complaint is made has been 
elected as a member of the National Assembly. He applied an instrumental test to evaluate 
whether the costs of disrupting ECK’s administrative schedule for conduct of elections 
justified its administrative decision refusing to give Aroko hearing rights, outweigh the likely 
benefits accruing from delaying his grievances until after the general electoral outcome is 
published. Such postponement would facilitate challenge of the outcome by a wider 
constituency of voters. He posed: 
…on one hand that situation is bad because a voter who feels offended during party 
nominations may find waiting upto the outcome of the elections of the National 
Assembly too long and may even think it too late, on the other hand the situation is 
good because it allows any person who is a voter, not necessarily a candidate, to 
challenge the validity of election results and grounds for challenging such an election 
may include what happened during the party nominations (party-primaries).102 
The court’s cost-benefit analysis determined that the public interest weighed against the ECK 
giving the aspirants hearing rights. ‘It is good that when the Electoral Commission sets the 
electoral process in motion, that motion is set to run upto the end as required by the National 
Assembly and Presidential Elections Act’.103 Yet regretfully: 
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that Act does not allow sufficient time or space within which to institute, prosecute and 
determine a suit in court challenging a nomination…without offending the provisions of 
that Act and its rules, without leading for example, to a conflict of laws or to a situation 
where the legal effect is to have a particular political party in a particular constituency in 
the country…have no parliamentary or presidential candidate. Courts should not be used 
to bring such drastic results instead of voters themselves doing it through the ballot box.104 
5.4 Call for Arbitration of Disputed Party Primaries 
Recognizing the principle that ‘the rule of law mustn’t bend to expediency’, Judge Khamoni 
in Aroko’s case rebuked the failure by political parties, officials and members to appreciate 
the effect of existing laws which preclude strategic bargaining by unsuccessful aspirants who 
should ‘avoid running hopelessly from place to place as majority hope (sic), step and some 
without enough energy to jump, during party nominations for elections to National 
Assembly’. He emphasized s 17 (1) of the NAPEA which provides that that a person deemed 
to be nominated by a political party for election as a member of the National Assembly has to 
be: 
selected in the manner provided for in the constitution or rules of the political party 
concerned relating to members of that party who wish to contest parliamentary 
elections…so that whether Kenya is having a Liberal or Strict Democracy, there is need 
for each political party to put its house in order so that intra-party grievances are contained 
within each party (emphasis in original).
105
 
The judge simultaneously made a strong social contractarian statement requiring a rule 
introducing non-instrumental administrative decisions to resolve disputed party primaries by 
giving hearing rights to unsuccessful aspirants so as to facilitate instrumental voting:  
Let each party have an efficient internal dispute mechanism within a good party 
constitution and rules regulating intra-party nominations/selections…and resultant  
grievances, disputes and disagreements, allowing sufficient time for dispute resolution 
within the party and well before the date to be set or already set for nominations.106 
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The court specifically called for party constitutions and rules to ‘also provide for quick 
arbitration clauses…’ Faulting the gap in the law, he conceded that: 
there may be need to review the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act and its 
rules to give more powers to the Electoral Commission and also to allow political parties 
ample time like six months, to do and complete, up to and including dispute resolution, 
their respective intra-party nominations…107  
The Aroko court criticized Kenyan law as it stands, including judicial review procedures, 
since: 
…for a case emanating from a dispute in selections or nominations between members of a 
political party or between such a member and officials of the party, to be in a court of law 
other than an ‘election court,’ safely and lawfully, that suit has to be instituted, prosecuted 
and determined before the Electoral Commission sets the process of the anticipated 
presidential and parliamentary elections in motion…108 
6. PROPORTIONALTIY AND SETTLEMENT OF POLYCENTRIC 
DISPUTES 
6.1 Private Persons and Public Bodies 
We have argued that on one hand, an utilitarian rule which gives procedural rights to 
instrumental administrative decisions establishes direct proportionality connecting non-
instrumental or expressive voting to substantive justice. Conversely, an universal rule of 
respect for individual autonomy establishes direct proportionality by connecting non-
instrumental administrative decisions to instrumental voting. Simultaneously, instrumental 
and non-instrumental rules are enshrined in the basic principle that a public body enjoys no 
such thing as unfettered discretion, stated in the English case of R v Tower Hawkes of 
London Bourough exparte Chetnick Developments Ltd. by Lord Bridge of Harwich:  
For private persons, the rule is that you may do anything you choose which the law does 
not prohibit. It means that the freedoms of the private citizen are not conditional upon 
some distinct and affirmative justification…But for public bodies the rule is the opposite. 
It is that any action to be taken must be justified by a positive law. A public body has no 
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legal rights which it enjoys for its own sake; at every turn all of its dealings constitute 
fulfillment of duties which it owes to others; indeed it exists for no other purpose.109 
Therefore while ‘it may be entitled to insist on this or that procedure be followed whether by a 
private person affected by its decision or superior body…the rule is necessary to protect 
people from arbitrary interference by those set in power over them.’ Sir William Wade 
explains ‘the principle which governs the relationship of public bodies and private persons 
with the law.’   
A private person has absolute power to allow whom he likes to use his land…regardless of 
his motives. This is unfettered discretion. But a public authority may do none of these 
things unless it acts in good faith and upon lawful and relevant grounds in the public 
interest…The whole conception of unfettered discretion is inappropriate to a public 
authority which possesses powers solely in order that it may use them for the public 
good.110 
6.2 New Frontiers of Judicial Review in Political Party Disputes 
Both Kenyatta and Aroko involved constitutional and statutory interpretation. In the 
former, the RS’s administrative discretion under the Societies Act and ECK’s constitutional 
discretion were construed broadly so as to require instrumental administrative decision-
making by according process rights. It is submitted that the court’s review of the RS’s 
decision, by holding that ‘non-instrumentalist’ administrative decision-making was required, 
effectively endorsed the expressive interest, given he African cultural context of anointing 
ethnic leaders. Hence the overall impact of the decision was inversely proportional. In the 
latter case, the defunct ECK’s discretion was construed narrowly so as to require instrumental 
administrative decision-making and not to give process rights. It follows that legislation can 
give rise to contradictory administrative requirements at different stages of intra-party 
elections by attaching different weight to process rights and achieving different balance 
between voter choices and electoral outcomes. Which principles guide the control of 
administrative discretion by Kenyan courts? The Kenyatta court applied the famous English 
case of Padfield v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food111 which held: ‘Where a 
statute does not by express words define the purposes to be exercised, the decision-maker is 
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bound nevertheless to ascertain and apply the aims intended since no statute can be 
purposeless’. Earlier, the landmark case of Associated Provincial Pictures v Wednesbury 
Corporation held that: 
a decision-maker who fails to take into account all and only those considerations material 
to his task, or who does not bring a rational mind to bear on what he is to do is in law, no 
more exercising power within the limbs of his confinement than if he nakedly usurps his 
power.112 
The court in Kenyatta accepted the entire grounds for intervention in judicial review, namely,  
‘procedural fairness, protected interest and legitimate expectation, irrelevant considerations 
and illegality, unreasonableness and bias, abuse of power, bad faith and procedural 
impropriety’.113 Was the Kenyatta court’s expansion of judicial review remedies to regulate 
intra-party disputes instead of leaving the task to voters, justified? In a commercial context, 
Wade wonders ‘what will be the effect if the courts grant legal remedies in non-legal situation. 
An extraordinarily wide discretion would create a new system for legal regulation of non-
legal activity’.114 Similarly, the respondents in Kenyatta’s case argued that, if political parties 
are private clubs designed to produce ‘club goods’ to satisfy the members’ preferences and if 
the court will compel party members to abide by its own constitution and to interpret them 
correctly, for Wade, ‘that amounts to giving them legislative force, so here is a variety of 
legislation which is generated privately and entirely independent of parliament’.115 Hence the 
significance of Kenyatta is that our courts for the first time recognized the need for 
administrative decisions to give process rights to aggrieved party leaders so as to attain 
substantive outcomes of constitutional associative and non-discriminatory freedoms. Yet one 
wonders why the court did not instead interpret political co-operation between KANU and 
ODM-K as instrumentally stifling political competition thus subverting the core purpose of 
multi-party democracy since it reduces the number of candidates available for a voter’s self-
interested choice. Michuki’s case116 illustrates that electoral markets entailing one-person-
one-vote do not facilitate equal parliamentary representation where constituency boundaries 
are distorted. Moreover in a first-past-the-post winner-take-all system, characterized by 
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skewed development policies, voter choices at both party leadership as well as general 
elections, are highly ethicized, or expressive. Hence optimum administrative decision-making, 
to confer voter preferences to election outcomes (for party leaders) should be instrumental. 
Conversely, voting at the party primaries nomination of MPs is relatively non-instrumental. 
However, the Aroko court was skeptical about judicial expansionism into party primaries. 
Rather, ‘an aggrieved member of a political party which is properly organized and managing 
its intra-party affairs can have redress within  his party conveniently, quickly, cheaply, quietly 
and amicably without having to wait for a court of law…’117 Judge Khamoni issued a 
hypothetical, counterfactual or Rawlsian dictum that: 
Siasa ya Tumbo (belly politics), the mother of ‘a deadened political plutocracy’ instead of 
Government for the people will not do, as in the former, Kenya will have to live with the 
kind of chaos this suit is the product of; yet Kenya needs the presence of chaosless and 
disciplined, consistent, transparent, trustworthy, principled and ideologically distinct 
political parties managing …a ‘Government for Social Justice’ (brackets and translation 
mine).118 
Is public law then to be brought in to redress the imbalance of power in the Kenyan political 
parties, where private law has previously reigned supreme? 
6.3 From Legitimate Expectations to Proportionality 
What then is the significant criterion which distinguishes the court decision in 
Kenyatta from Aroko? It is submitted that the proportionality principle, unstated in both 
cases, accounts for their conflicting viewpoints. Both decisions implicitly recognize and base 
their findings on the principle of proportionality as a ground for judicial review in Kenya first 
recognized in Republic v Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair & 2 
Others exparte Saitoti.
119
 In Saitoti’s case the commission’s investigations suspected him of 
responsibility for payment of export compensation from the exchequer in the infamous 
Goldenberg scandal. Saitoti argued inter alia that not only had parliament, in 1995, 
exonerated his role in the scam thus creating legitimate expectations against prosecution, but 
also the commission’s failure to give him process rights in arriving at its decision have 
substantial direct and irreversible consequences which are wholly disproportionate. The 
                                                            
117  Supra note 91,  775. 
118  Ibid. 
119  [2006] eKLR (accessed 18 January 2010). 
28 
 
amount allegedly paid during Saitoti’s tenure as Finance Minister was allegedly 225  million 
out of the subsequent kshs 13.8 billion (US$ dollars 200 million) or possibly kshs 30 billion 
(US$ dollars 500 million) stolen. Quashing the commission’s decision touching upon Saitoti 
and prohibiting his prosecution on Goldenberg related matters, Nyamu (as he then was), 
Wendoh and Emuhule JJ held:  
The principle of proportionality is recognized in our constitution. In 1980 the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe did define proportionality as under:-
An appropriate balance must be maintained between the adverse effects which an 
administrative authority decision may have on the right, liberties or interests of the 
person concerned and the purpose which the authority is seeking to pursue. In view of 
our conclusions of irrationality, unreasonableness, illegality, bias and bad faith we find 
that since the interests of the applicant were not in any way inconsistent with the 
Commission’s fair faithful and impartial findings the ultimate decision, determination 
or findings concerning the applicant are out of proportion – the Commission struck the 
incorrect balance. 120 
They innovated: 
…where there is a likelihood of breach of fundamental rights and freedoms the courts 
should adopt a high intensity review in considering the conclusions reached based on 
this principle. When the high intensity test or a more searching scrutiny by the court is 
applied as it should be because there is an element of human rights the major 
conclusions cannot in our view satisfy the test and certiorari would also issue on the 
ground of proportionality. It should be noted that proportionality is well entrenched in 
our Constitution especially in the determination on limitations in chapter 5 (on 
fundamental rights) of the Constitution (emphasis and brackets mine). 
Similarly Kenyatta argued against Biwott’s interference with the Uhuru faction’s 
constitutional freedom of association and from discrimination. Gordon Anthony shows that 
proportionality effectively displaces the Wednesbury basis of substantive protection of 
legitimate expectations as a ground of judicial review i.e. that where an individual could 
demonstrate that a prior practice or representation gave rise to a legitimate expectation of a 
particular outcome, receipt or benefit, then interests of fairness prevents public bodies from 
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lawfully resiling.121 The rationale is that the legitimate expectations principle increases legal 
certainty and public trust. By contrasting the reasoning in Kenyatta and Aroko this chapter 
argues that although the proportionality principle was not expressly invoked as the basis of 
either decision, in reality it explains each of them.  Recall Craig’s instrumentality test that 
courts use proportionality as the reference point against which to balance the cost to the 
administration from having to give process rights against the likely effect that the giving of 
such rights will have on the final decision.122 Anthony further asserts that ‘decisions in the 
macro-political field will of democratic necessity demand a greater degree of judicial 
deference’.123  Cases like Saitoti or Kenyatta will inevitably be highly politicized hence it 
might be expected that, in such cases, ‘changes of policy fuelled by broad conceptions of the 
public interest, may more readily be accepted as taking precedence over the groups which 
enjoyed greater expectations of an earlier policy’.124 Unfortunately as in Aroko conversely, 
‘of course there may be some cases at the “micro” end of the spectrum, in which judicial 
intervention is immediately deemed inappropriate’.
125
 A middle way reconciles the 
inconvenience to the decision-maker with safeguarding of voter autonomy. 
6.4 Arbitration of Polycentric Political Disputes 
Political parties being quasi-public bodies, give rise to disputes which perhaps lie in 
between the two extremes on account of what Lon Fuller first called their ‘polycentric 
nature’.126  As Kenyan post-2007 voting violence127 in an inter-party dispute, following 
ECK’s refusal to accord the opposition candidate, Raila a hearing prior to declaring Kibaki 
the winner, demonstrates, refusal to recognize elected intra-party officials or nominated 
candidates may similarly carry with it implications not just of public expenditure but also and 
thereby  for other individuals not party to the proceedings. In complex cases, fair procedures 
need not be modeled upon the rules of natural justice suitable for adversarial, adjudicative 
contexts.  Numerous other decisional forms exist: mediation, arbitration, voting, resort to 
chance, contract, managerial direction, and legislations. Each of these modes of decision-
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making will generate a set of process rights. Criminal procedure and evidence law are best 
suited to determining bivalent questions such as guilt or innocence, relevance or irrelevance 
and admissible or inadmissible. Instead, an administrative law approach is recommended to 
deal effectively with macro disputes emerging from situations involving a multiplicity of 
actors with variegated interests which require accommodation. Hence the legal method of 
reducing a complex dispute into a simple contest between an aggrieved aspirant and his 
supporters, on one hand, against the successful candidate and political party officials on the 
other, perhaps falsely obscures the deeper malaise afflicting voters in Kenyan political parties, 
generally which implicates not mere failure by public administrative officials to apply a high 
intensity test in exercise of discretion where human rights are violated, but also to adopt either 
an instrumental or non-instrumental approach in proportion to the size of the dispute where 
political parties fail to effective self-regulation mechanisms. On the criteria of scope of 
adjudication, John Allison concludes that giving of process rights goes beyond macro-
political or even quasi-public cases, and extends to micro-private disputes:  
The polycentricity of scarcity licensing has implications for judicial review. Scarce public 
resources are analogous to scarce licences. Their allocation at one point affects their 
availability at another. The adjudicative court hearing applications for judicial review does 
not itself make allocations in regard to public-law rights but it does review administrative 
decisions that have serious repercussions for allocation of resources. Assisted only by 
partisan arguments of parties the court is ill equipped to determine the nature and extent of 
those repercussions.  Because of its limited competence the court cannot adequately assess 
the risk of administrative disruption when it quashes administrative decisions and requires 
their reconsideration…In disputes that are significantly polycentric because they invite the 
allocation of scarce licences, or affect comparatively scarce public resources, the court has 
reason to show judicial restraint. Judicial restraint is, then, understandable not only in 
obviously political cases or those directly affecting the central tenets of government policy 
but also in everyday administrative disputes. 
Dworkin is concerned with the application of the principle of equal liberty and priority of 
rights over expediency or public interest in actual legal-political issues such as minority 
rights. Because ‘rights are trumps’ invoked by individuals who may resist even lawfully made 
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legitimate administrative decisions, he prefers a Kantian/Rawlsian rights-based rather than 
utilitarian rule-based model to decisions.128 
  
7. POLITICAL RIGHTS UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
This paper postulates a hypothesis that non-instrumental administrative decisions are 
directly proportional to instrumental voter choice, and vice versa. A historical journey was 
taken through Kenyan electoral history to elicit specific variables which condition voter, 
politicians and bureaucrats. Traditionally, gerontocratic leaders are anointed as party leaders 
whose membership is ethnically based. Party leadership voting is generally expressive of 
ethnicity, leading to personalized, autocratic governance. However, voter choices at party 
primaries, to nominate parliamentary candidates are relatively more self-interested from 
within ethnic groups. Because party leaders influence the parliamentary nominations in favour 
of preferred candidates, therefore popular but unsuccessful aspirants tend to engage in 
strategic positioning. To protest against intra-party rigging they defect to alternative platforms 
immediately prior to general elections thus fragmenting their parties. At general elections, 
leaders foster strategic ethnic coalitions which tend to reduce political competition. Voter 
choices at this stage are not instrumental, but expressive of a ‘3-piece’ formula whereby they 
choose the presidential candidate of their ethnic leader together with parliamentary and 
councilors of the same party, irrespective of political ideology.  
The schizophrenic approach to regulating political parties proposed by institutional design of 
the new Constitution129 incorporates lessons regarding political rights130 from recent 
jurisprudence. The instrumental voting phase of party leadership requires regulation by an 
non-instrumental or expressive Political Parties Commission.
131
 This would reflect a response 
to both Kenyatta’s and Aroko’s cases’ calls for a Political Parties Act and for an arbitrative 
approach towards regulation of intra-party disputes akin to private, club or micro-party 
aspects,132 To apparently prevent the notorious culture of last-minute defections, rent-seeking 
or strategic bargaining by unsuccessful candidates at nominations decried in Aroko, the new 
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Constitution precludes nomination by a registered political party unless a person has been a 
member for a minimum of 6 months prior to the election date.133 Parliamentary legislation 
shall provide for inter alia, ‘the resolution of disputes between members of a political party 
including parties forming part of a coalition, and between a party and the Commissioner of 
Political Parties’.134 Similarly, an Act of Parliament shall establish mechanisms for settling 
electoral disputes.135 The significant word is settling, rather than resolving. Hence arbitrative 
mechanisms appear to be envisaged in departure from the adversarial approach reserved for 
determining civil dispute. Significantly, an instrumental CPP must consider the costs and 
benefits of giving process rights to settle dispute arising from expressive voters or ousted 
officials dissatisfied by anointment of leaders’ ultra vires party constitutions. 
The new Constitution deals with overlapping party-cum-parliamentary interaction 
such as regulating cessation of party membership. Dual party membership is outlawed. While 
for MPs, resignation is recognized, expulsion for indiscipline requires a fair hearing and 
becomes effective only after fourteen days upon written notice from the party secretary 
general to the speaker of the national assembly, within which an aggrieved member has a 
right of petition to the high court. In recognition of the potential wider impact of delaying 
polycentric political disputes, such petition for declaration must be determined within ninety 
days.136 The rationale behind the Kenyatta decision is adopted in entirety. Hence the new 
Constitution provides that the existence of the following circumstances only shall not amount 
to a member leaving the party: ‘(a) the creation or dissolution of a coalition of which a 
member’s political party forms part; (b) the dissolution of a political party to which the 
member belongs; or (c) the merger of two or more parties of which the member’s party forms 
part’.
137
 This provision curtails political competition but reflects the realities of Kenyan 
political anointment of party leaders and officials and expressive voting patterns endorsing 
party leaders by acclamation. It is only at the relatively ethnically-neutral nomination stage 
that intra-party ethnicity is neutral and assuming free and fair procedures, self interested 
voting is decisive. Negating the Kenyatta case, the new Constitution proposes to curtail high 
court judicial review jurisdiction and instead ultimately, the constitutional court can vindicate 
voter’s political choices.  
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The proposed establishment of an Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
to settle disputed party primaries before the electoral outcome reduces administrative 
instrumentality under National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, thus facilitating 
instrumental voting at nomination as predicted by the proportionality principle. The IEBC138 
is proposed to succeed the discredited ECK with jurisdiction macro or public aspect of 
political parties. The legislative postponement of nomination disputes pending general 
electoral outcomes according to the Aroko court’s interpretation of National Assembly and 
Presidential Elections Act Cap 7 Laws of Kenya (NAPEA) under the rule in Ngei’s case is 
repealed under the new Constitution. Instead, the administrative cost of giving process rights 
is to aspirants genuinely aggrieved by rigged nominations is less than the benefit accruing 
from increasing the likelihood that a non-instrumental IEBC’s administrative decision shall 
improve substantive rights of citizens. If the intra-party constitutions do not effectively 
arbitrate over political rights or if the IEBC fails to settle disputed party primaries, then the 
new Constitution prescribes that notwithstanding polycentric nature of political disputes, 
citizens have recourse to a proposed constitutional court139 to vindicate political rights. Thus, 
although orthodox judicial review before the high court appears ousted, nevertheless the new 
Constitution endorses Dworkin’s principle that rights are trumps’ which override the public 
interest even assuming administrative decisions are legitimately made, if the discretion does 
not increase the substantive outcome of a free and fair election.140 Hence creation of a 
separate and therefore instrumental Commissioner of Political Parties to settle party 
leadership disputes while establishing a non-instrumental (or relatively less instrumental in 
comparison with the extremely instrumental NAPEA) Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission to arbitrate over party primaries validates the proportionality hypothesis. Both 
new constitutional institutions effectively incorporate the dictums of the Kenyatta and Aroko 
cases. Uniquely, the new Constitution proposes that Kenyan party leadership disputes are to 
be arbitrated as macro disputes although parties are technically more ‘private’. Conversely, 
party primaries are regulated as though micro disputes similar to the market, although 
theoretically nominations more directly affect the general elections and should therefore be 
regarded as more public. The new Constitution retains adjudicative approaches as a last resort 
to resolving political party disputes only after exhaustion of internal mechanisms and 
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arbitration. It enshrines enhanced political rights and fair administrative rights. Hence its 
provisions reflect the proportionality principle given the hybrid character of national interest 
declared in its preamble that: ‘We the people of Kenya…PROUD…of our ethnic, cultural and 
religious diversity and determined to live in peace and unity as one indivisible and sovereign 
nation’. 
